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 POB 
ANNUAL REPORT /1990-1991 
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
SEC Practice Section
American Institu te o f 
C ertified Public Accountants
The sta ff o f  the Office o f  the Chief Accountant has noted  
significant im provem ents in the quality  o f  the 
docum entation p ro v id ed  to it  by the QCIC. This im proved  
docum entation, along with discussions with the POB, allow s 
the sta ff to better understand the QCIC process. The 
Commission believes tha t the process p rov ides added  
assurances, as a  supplem ent to the SECPS p eer review
program , that m ajor quality  control deficiencies, i f  any, 
are identified a n d  addressed in a  m ore tim ely fashion. 
Therefore, the Commission believes that the QCIC process
benefits the pu b lic  interest.
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
1990 ANNUAL REPORT
This is a sum m ary o f the Public Oversight B oard’s thirteenth annual report. The complete 1990-1991 annual 
report has been issued in combination with the SEC Practice Section. Copies are available by w riting to the 
offices o f the Public Oversight Board.
Im pact of Mandatory SECPS Membership
The most important factor driving the Public Oversight Board’s 
activities in 1990-1991 has been the increase in SECPS member­
ship and the related expansion of oversight responsibility caused by 
the January 1990 AICPA bylaw 
change. That change mandated 
SEC Practice Section member­
ship for all firms in the AICPA 
that audit SEC clients and has 
dramatically affected the Section 
and its peer review program. As 
of June 30, 1991, 1,135 firms 
were members of the SECPS, 
compared with 504 in June 1989.
More significantly, the number of 
peer reviews conducted by the 
Section doubled from 163 in 1989 
to 325 in 1990. In 1991, 392 
firms will undergo reviews; for 
306 of these firms, this will be 
the first independent review of 
their quality control systems. Be­
cause of this substantial rise in Section membership and the coinci­
dent increase in peer review oversight, the Public Oversight Board 
has taken steps to ensure that its responsibilities are fulfilled in a 
manner that safeguards the public interest.
A b o u t the SECPS and the POB
The SEC Practice Section was founded in 1977 as a voluntary 
organization of CPA firms striving for professional excellence in 
the auditing services they provide to Securities and Exchange Com­
mission (SEC) registrant companies. It is part of the Division for 
CPA Firms of the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA)—the na­
tional professional association of more than 300,000 CPAs in public 
practice, industry, government and education—and is overseen by 
the Public Oversight Board.
The Section (or the “SECPS”) imposes membership require­
ments and administers two fundamental programs to ensure that 
SEC registrants are audited by accounting firms with adequate 
quality control systems: (1) peer review, through which Section 
members have their practices reviewed every three years by other 
accountants, and (2) quality control inquiry, which reviews allega­
tions of audit failure contained in certain litigation filed against 
member firms to determine if the firms’ quality control systems 
require corrective measures.
Currently, the requirements of the SECPS affect more than 
113,000 professionals at 1,135 member firms, which audit more 
than 14,200 SEC registrants.
The Public Oversight Board (the “POB” or “ Board”) is an 
autonomous body consisting of five members with a broad spec­
trum of business, professional, regulatory and legislative experi­
ence. The Board’s primary responsibility is to safeguard the public 
interest (1) when the SECPS sets, revises and enforces standards,
membership requirements, rules and procedures, and (2) when the 
Section’s committees consider the results of individual peer re­
views and the possible implications of litigation alleging audit fail­
ure. The Board also evaluates whether SECPS peer reviews are 
conducted by carefully trained professionals possessing the requi­
site objectivity and skill. To preserve its independence, the Board 
appoints its own members, chairman and staff, sets its compensa­
tion, and establishes its own operating procedures.
B oard  Activities
The Board acknowledges its responsibility to consider the integrity 
of the audit process from the broadest possible perspective. 
Accordingly, it maintains active relationships with organizations 
that scrutinize the profession, including the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, the Chief Accountant and staff of the SEC, 
the Comptroller General of the U.S., the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board and the Auditing Standards Board. In its delibera­
tions, the Board carefully considers all comments, reports and 
proposals that these bodies and authorities publish which may 
affect the profession.
In addition to its six regularly scheduled meetings, this year 
the Board met with representatives of the largest SECPS member 
firms, regulators and other constituents. The Board also held an 
“ outreach program” with the Illinois Society of CPAs, at which it 
met with leaders of large and small SECPS member firms. All these 
discussions helped shape the Board’s views on topics such as the 
current economic environment and its impact on firms’ audit prac­
tices, the significance of accounting standards-setting efforts to 
resolve issues concerning “mark to market” accounting, the need 
for understandable standards to facilitate consistent evaluations of 
internal control by public companies and their auditors, and the 
importance of decisive action by the profession to enhance audi­
tors’ independence for financial institution engagements.
This year the Board spoke out on several occasions on 
matters affecting or potentially affecting the inde­
pendent audit function. In early January, the 
Board wrote to the chief executive officers of the 
20 firms then represented on the SECPS Executive 
Committee, urging that great care be exercised in 
audits of financial institutions and that financial 
statement disclosures adequately communicate the 
risks and uncertainties inherent in balance sheet 
asset valuation. In March, the Board asked the 
SECPS to proscribe professionals in Section mem­
ber firms from borrowing from financial institution 
clients in order to maintain independence in fact, 
and also, the public’s perception of it. Before the 
Section could implement this recommendation, the 
AICPA’s Ethics Committee took decisive action on 
this matter and proposed a proscription for the en­
tire profession. Finally, the Board wrote to the Au­
diting Standards Board with observations on two 
proposed statements on auditing standards and to 
the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission (COSO) on its exposure draft “ Internal 
Control—Integrated Framework.” The Board’s concerns about 
the COSO exposure draft are referred to in the commentary sec­
tion of this report.
To maintain the intensity of its oversight activities in the 
face of surging membership, this year the Board again expanded 
its staff, engaging and training three recently retired partners 
from SECPS member firms to supplement—on a part-time basis— 
the four permanent and four part-time staff who conduct peer 
review oversight. The new part-time staff are located in geo­
graphic regions with high densities of member firms, which will 
help minimize the costs associated with the oversight program. 
These staff additions will enable the Board to continue its tradi­
tion of close and rigorous oversight despite the record number of 
reviews scheduled for 1991.
It is the Board’s opinion, based on its intensive oversight, 
that the SECPS self-regulatory program contributes significantly to 
the quality of auditing in the U.S., particularly the quality of public 
company audits. The Board is pleased that the SEC shares this 
view, and that a growing number of other regulatory agencies have 
required triennial peer reviews for firms performing audits under 
their jurisdiction.
The POB is proud to report that this year’s recipient of The 
John J. McCloy Award was Thomas L. Holton. The Award was 
presented to Mr. Holton in January in recognition of his outstand­
ing contributions to the improvement of audit quality in this coun­
try. The first codification of U.S. auditing standards was completed 
during his tenure as chairman of the AICPA Auditing Standards 
Executive Committee. Mr. Holton also chaired the AICPA Special 
Committee to Study Quality Review for Multi-Office Firms, which 
helped shape the profession’s peer review program.
Oversight of the Peer Review Process
Peer review is the cornerstone of the SECPS’s efforts to improve 
the quality of its members’ practices. It involves an independent, 
rigorous examination of a firm’s quality control system for its ac­
counting and auditing practice, as well as its compliance with that 
system. Each member firm’s most recent peer review results—in
Scope o f POB Oversight o f  1990 Peer Reviews Classified by 
Number o f SEC Registrants Audited by Reviewed Firm
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Peer Reviews Accepted During Year Ended June 30, 1991
 _____________________  Initial Subsequent Total
Unqualified......................................... 88 (88%) 206 (95%) 294 (93%)
Qualified............................................. 10 (10%) 10 (5% ) 20 (6% )
Adverse............................................... 2 (2% ) 0 — 2 (1% )
Total:........................... ..................  100 (100%) 216(100%) 316(100%)
Peer Reviews Accepted Since Inception
 _____________________  Initial Subsequent Total
Unqualified......................................... 592 (85%) 995 (93%) 1,577 (90%)
Qualified............................................. 89 (13%) 70 (7%) 159 (9%)
Adverse............................................... 19 (2%) 2 — 21 (1%)
Total: ................................................. 690(100%) 1,067 (100%) 1,757 (100%)
the form of a report, a letter of comments, which 
may recommend corrective actions, and the firm’s 
response—are kept in a public file at the AICPA, 
and are available for inspection.
The Public Oversight Board carefully moni­
tors and evaluates the effectiveness of peer review.
Board members and staff attend all Peer Review 
Committee meetings, and the Board’s staff pro­
vides comprehensive written reports on the com­
mittee’s deliberations.
In addition, the Board actively monitors the 
Peer Review Committee’s follow-up of corrective 
actions.
The Board’s staff directly oversees each peer 
review by using one of three types of oversight 
programs, which vary in intensity according to 
characteristics and past compliance record of the 
reviewed firms and the review teams.
P eer Review Oversight Activities
Visitation and Workpaper Review. This is the most intense 
level of oversight. Of the 325 SECPS peer reviews conducted in 
1990, the Board’s staff attended 85 operating office and final exit 
conferences held in connection with 70 reviews.
Workpaper Review. The POB conducted a thorough examina­
tion of all workpapers and reports’ of 137 firms, including virtually 
all the reviews of firms that audit SEC clients which were not 
visited.
Report Review. For the remaining 118 firms, the Board re­
viewed reports and selected peer review workpapers.
Because of the dramatic increase in the volume of peer re­
views resulting from mandatory SECPS membership, the number 
of POB staff visitations to firms undergoing peer reviews has risen 
from 56 in 1989 to 70 in 1990. Of those 1990 visitations, 44 in­
volved member firms that had never undergone an independent 
review of their quality control systems.
The SEC, through the office of its Chief Accountant, over­
sees the peer review process and POB oversight of the process. The 
SEC’s inspection of the 1990 peer reviews is substantially com­
plete, and the Board expects the SEC to again endorse the process 
in its annual report.
Commentary on Peer Review
The Board has identified two ways to strengthen an already sound 
peer review process. The first, addressed in last year’s report, 
concerns the length of time taken to process certain reviews. As of 
June 30, 1991, nine of the 325 reports on 1990 reviews were not 
yet complete. In each case, the reviewed firms failed to respond on 
a timely basis to requests for information. The Board has communi­
cated its suggestions for expediting review processing to the Sec­
tion’s Peer Review Committee.
The Board also believes that peer review letters of comments 
should communicate review findings clearly, not only to the firm’s 
management and the Peer Review Committee, but also to audit 
committee members and other public users. However, the brevity 
of the commentary in some letters might lead to misunderstandings
by those not familiar with the procedures and the terms used in 
connection with peer reviews. In response to this concern, the 
Peer Review Committee will reconsider the standards for preparing 
letters of comments this year.
T he QCIC: A Complement to Peer Review
No matter how strongly peer review encourages firms to maintain 
effective quality controls, business and other failures occur—and 
lawsuits often follow. When a lawsuit involving, generally, a pub­
lic company is filed against an SECPS member firm or its person­
nel, the firm must report it to the Section within 30 days.
The Quality Control Inquiry Committee (the “ QCIC” ), 
which receives these reports, complements the peer review process 
by considering whether allegations of audit failure by member 
firms indicate either (1) an aberrational error, (2) a shortcoming in 
the firm’s quality controls or its compliance with them, or (3) a 
need to reconsider professional standards.
The QCIC does not duplicate the work of the courts, the 
SEC or other regulatory agencies. Those bodies determine 
whether the auditing firm or individual auditors were at fault and 
impose punishment. Rather, the QCIC decides whether deficien-
Results o f QCIC Activity 
■
11/1/79
through
6/30/90
7/1/90
through
6/30/91 Totals
Actions Related to Firms:
Either a special review was made, the firm’s 
regularly scheduled peer review was expanded 
or other relevant work was inspected............... 38 7 45
A firm took appropriate corrective measures 
that were responsive to the implications of the 
specific case....................................................... 53 8 61
Actions Related to Standards:
Appropriate AICPA technical bodies were asked 
to consider the need for changes in, or guidance 
on, professional standards.................................  36 3 39
Actions Related to Individuals:
The case was referred to the AICPA Professional 
Ethics Division with a recommendation for 
investigation into the work of specific
individuals......................................................... 15 1 16
Total:...............................................................  142 19 161
(Note: Frequently, more than one action is taken by the QCIC or by the firm .)
cies exist in the defendant firm’s quality control system and, if 
so, recommends corrective actions. If a firm refuses to cooperate 
with the QCIC, the QCIC can recommend to the SECPS Executive 
Committee that the firm be sanctioned. To date, no such action 
has ever been necessary.
The Board exercises close scrutiny of QCIC activities. This 
year, members of the Board’s staff, usually accompanied by a 
Board member, attended the five QCIC meetings and nearly all 
QCIC task force meetings with representatives of the firms report­
ing litigation. The Board also reviews memoranda on each case to 
determine that the QCIC properly fulfills its responsibilities. Based 
on these activities, the Board believes that appropriate consider­
ation was given to the 51 cases closed this year, and that the QCIC 
adequately complements the peer review process.
Commentary on the QCIC
The Board identified several initiatives that can improve the effec­
tiveness of QCIC activities, and communicated these to the QCIC 
chairman. In particular, the Board recommended that prior to 
meeting with representatives of a firm reporting litigation, the 
QCIC staff should obtain more data about the firm’s quality con­
trols and the environment in which the allegedly faulty audit was 
conducted. The Board also urged the QCIC to review its policies for 
the inspection of documentation, such as firm guidance and policy 
relating to the allegation. The QCIC considered these suggestions 
in August 1991 and is acting on them.
The Board commends member firms for having improved 
their procedures for reporting cases to the QCIC on a more timely 
basis, an area noted for improvement in last year’s report.
This year, the QCIC established a new requirement short of a 
“ special review”—it can now request other engagements con­
ducted by the engagement team to be inspected by the firm under 
QCIC direction to determine if any corrective action is needed to 
improve compliance or understanding of quality controls. More­
over, if the committee decides that such inspection is unnecessary 
in defined circumstances, it must give its reasons in the “ closed 
case summary,” to which the SEC has access. This closed case 
summary and the Board’s completed oversight program are made 
available to SEC staff. This year, the office of the Chief Accountant 
of the SEC reviewed 29 cases closed in 1990-1991.
Major Corrective Measures Imposed Since
Inception to Ensure that Quality
Control Deficiencies are Corrected Number of Times
Since
  Action_________________________________________ During 1990 Inception
Accelerated peer review......................................... 1 45
Employment of an outside consultant acceptable 
to the Peer Review Committee to perform 
preissuance reviews of all or selected financial 
statements or other specified procedures............ 4 33
Revisits by the peer reviewers or visits by a 
committee member to ascertain progress made 
by the firm in implementing corrective actions.. 4 124
Review of the planning for and results of the firm’s 
internal inspection program............................... 36 125
Review of changes made to the firm’s quality 
control document or other manuals and 
checklists............................................................. 4 38
P ob Commentary on the Accounting Profession
While the POB’s formal charter is to oversee the activities of the SECPS, the Board also recognizes its responsibility 
to monitor and, when appropriate, to comment on matters that may affect the integrity of the audit process and the 
credibility of financial statements. The Board believes it would ill serve the public interest if  the quality control process 
were a model of efficiency and integrity while other forces and circumstances destroyed the profession's or the public’s 
confidence in it. Hence, we feel constrained to include in this report the following comments.
Auditor Independence. Auditor independence presumes integ­
rity, objectivity and the ability to make unbiased judgments about 
the proper application of GAAP to client financial statements. 
Historically, these judgments are the sternest tests of indepen­
dence, as they are often made in the face of strong, often adversar­
ial, management opinion. Not surprisingly, these judgments are at 
the heart of auditor independence—and are the focus of most 
allegations of audit failure.
In the aftermath of the economic boom of the 1980s and the 
ensuing recession, and especially because of the “ S&L crisis,” 
allegations of audit failure naturally followed. Today, standards for 
the performance and independence of auditors are constantly chal­
lenged and cries for change are heard in the Congress and echoed 
in the media.
The Board has observed through its oversight of QCIC pro­
ceedings that relatively few allegations of audit failure involve 
matters about which the auditor was unaware. In nearly all QCIC 
cases the audit procedures applied detected the nature of the trans­
actions that are being contested in lawsuits. Rather than the audi­
tors “ missing” problems, most allegations involve matters that the 
auditor has considered and reached a judgment about. When enti­
ties subsequently encounter economic difficulties, these judgments 
can be, and often are, challenged by shareholders, creditors or 
other third parties suffering economic loss.
The Board is not surprised that in these challenges, hind­
sight frequently prevails. Experts analyzing past auditor decisions 
often disagree with judgments made on the firing line. In financial 
institutions, for example, auditor judgments reached early in the 
decade about asset value, particularly involving real estate, and 
recoverability are now considered fair game for criticism. Yet the 
fact that today’s values have dropped precipitously since the time 
the auditor reached an opinion does not alone support an allega­
tion of audit failure.
While the Board recognizes that some aberrant decisions have 
led to widespread criticism of the auditing function, we believe that 
these scattered incidents do not reflect a fundamental flaw in the 
profession or its practices and, therefore, fail to justify taking drastic 
and ill-conceived steps to improve auditor independence.
Nevertheless, all of this suggests that when applying profes­
sional judgment the importance of every professional maintaining 
a healthy degree of skepticism and being unrelenting in approach­
ing difficult and complex financial statement issues—despite client 
tensions and outright disagreements—must be continually stressed 
and focused upon. Auditors must insist on the most appropriate 
application of GAAP and not accept a presentation designed with­
out regard to the intent of the rules. They must require unbiased 
estimates that reflect the most probable outcomes. And they must 
demand disclosures that fully describe the risks and uncertainties 
about asset recoverability. To do otherwise, even when “permit­
ted” by accounting standards, is to risk damage to the profession 
and to the firm itself.
When auditors insist upon the most appropriate financial 
presentation there are occasional tensions with clients. We recog­
nize that these client encounters are difficult. More important, 
they are often the sternest test of auditor professionalism, in the 
final analysis what independence is all about.
QCIC Lessons. This year, the Board published “Evolution of the 
Quality Control Inquiry Committee” by Robert K. Mautz and 
Charles J. Evers to memorialize this important component of the 
profession’s self-regulatory program. The booklet also describes 
how the profession reconciled two conflicting forces: the protec­
tion of the public interest on the one hand and, on the other, the 
right of a firm to mount a vigorous defense against audit failure 
litigation. The Board is confident that the current QCIC process 
balances the interests of all parties, but believes that the commit­
tee will continue to evolve as it has over the past 12 years.
To that end, the Board believes now is a good time to “step 
back’’ and assess whether the QCIC cases collectively suggest mat­
ters that Section member firms should consider. Below are the 
results of this preliminary analysis of QCIC cases closed over the 
last three years:
■ Approximately 55% of the cases allege inadequate response by 
the auditor to client internal control deficiencies.
■ Approximately 33% of the cases allege failure by the auditor to 
detect the consequences of management fraud.
■ The probability of a public company auditor being named in a 
complaint increases by 600% after the auditor/client relation­
ship has been terminated.
■ The probability of a successor auditor being named in a com­
plaint is 300% higher than the probability of an action being 
brought against continuing auditors of public companies.
■ In about 33% of the cases, the engagement team consulted at the 
regional or national office level with other knowledgeable ex­
perts about matters alleged in complaints.
The results of this summary suggest that a comprehensive 
database about QCIC cases may help the profession to better under­
stand the implications of litigation and perhaps assist in identifying 
possible actions to reduce the likelihood of litigation. The Board is 
presently designing its specifications for such a database.
Auditor Litigation. The Board believes that the litigation 
besetting the profession is perhaps its most far-reaching and perva­
sive problem. It has been suggested that the financial risk stem­
ming from court judgments may be deterring the most talented 
students from pursuing accounting careers. The recent bankruptcy 
of a large firm and the ensuing claims against its partners surely 
give substance to these concerns.
While the Board believes on the basis of its oversight activi­
ties that auditor liability does not stem from deficiencies in firms’ 
control systems, there is evidence that individuals do occasionally
CONTINUED
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depart from compliance with these systems or make serious mis­
takes of judgment that subject them and their firms to liability. No 
quality control system can prevent these aberrations.
There is also evidence that often auditors are charged in 
cases where they have limited responsibility for losses suffered by 
investors, and yet, if other defendants are insolvent, the entire 
burden of damages falls upon the auditors.
During this coming year, the Board, in addition to developing 
the database discussed above, intends to study the effects of suits 
against auditors upon the profession and its implications for future 
audit quality. The public interest demands a strong accounting 
profession willing to express meaningful opinions upon which the 
public may rely in making credit and investment decisions, a pro­
fession made up of talented and dedicated men and women un­
afraid that the aberrational conduct of a partner thousands of miles 
away may inflict financial ruin upon him or her. We believe our 
proposed inquiry is demanded by the public interest.
Reports on Internal Control. In its 1989-1990 annual report, 
the Board observed that existing management reports on internal 
control effectiveness vary in style and content. Consequently, the
Board urged the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (COSO) to develop management reporting 
standards when it developed guidance on internal controls in the 
private sector. The Board is pleased that COSO included such re­
porting guidance in its March 12, 1991 exposure draft.
However, the Board also believes that the COSO exposure 
draft has serious potential for misunderstanding that can lead to 
false expectations about the effectiveness of the internal controls if 
and when they are reported on. Most notably, the Board believes 
the draft does not provide sufficient explanation of the nature and 
limitations of internal controls. In addition, it includes internal 
control “ components” that are not susceptible to objective evalua­
tion, and proposes a measurement and reporting criteria method 
that may imply an unrealistic level of reliability in the internal 
control systems of many reporting entities.
The Board has provided COSO with a comment letter 
expressing its concerns about the exposure draft standards and 
containing suggestions that recognize the nature, differences and 
limitations of internal control systems. We urge COSO to give care­
ful consideration to our comments.
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